



# **EXHIBIT 21**

## **REDACTED**

U.S. Army North (Fifth Army)


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## Los Angeles Federal Protection

This slide deck has an overall classification of:

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**Purpose:** To inform Commander, TF 51 of the federal protection mission in support of DHS operations in Carpinteria, CA [

**AGENDA:**

1. This brief provides the TF51 commander an overview of the planned mission in support of **HSI activities IVO Carpinteria**
2. General Concept of:
  - Task Organization
  - Operational Environment (Situation)
  - Civil Analysis & Mission
  - Concept of the Operation
  - Concepts of Medical, Sustainment, Communications
  - Risk Analysis/Mitigation & Contingencies


**INPUTS:**

- RFA from requesting agency for mission support
- Coordinated plan from supported agency and supporting DoD element, 49 MP BDE (870 MP CO)

**OUTPUTS:**

- Mission Approval/Disapproval
- Refinements necessary for approval as required

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TF 51 - Executive Summary – RFA 37\_ Carpinteria

Task Organization

MP












MP

MP Squad


MP

MP Squad

Recovery Team

Element	Vehicles	Leader	Composition
<div>MP</div>	<div></div>	<div></div>	1x 31A 10x 31B 1x 68W
<div>MP</div>	<div></div>	<div></div>	11x 31B 1x 68W
<div><div></div></div>	<div></div>	<div></div>	4x 31B 2x 91B

Threat Situation



Overall Threat Assessment: Low-to-moderate

Carpinteria is not considered a high-risk environment for violent agitator activity; however, operations involving federal agencies—especially those perceived as immigration-related or involving public-facing arrests—can trigger localized mobilization of activist groups. DoD personnel should be at low risk. The most likely threat faced by DoD personnel are crimes of opportunity such as theft and vandalism. Agitator tactics: Likely nonviolent but disruptive, including live streaming and doxing of agents or vehicles, physically obstructing arrests or transport vehicles, and intentionally escalating to provoke excessive use-of-force claims.



**Recent activities in similar environments:** Federal agents experience routine organized non-violent response to similar operations in rural areas.

**Known or likely defensive positions or fortified structures:** None present. Possible vehicle obstructions at the intersections of CA-150 and CA-192; CA-150 and Casitas Pass Road.

**Estimated likelihood of planned or potential protest:** Probability of spontaneous protest: Low to Moderate — While Carpinteria itself is unlikely to see large crowds form organically, intelligence leaks or real-time social media chatter could result in dozens of demonstrators at high-visibility locations (e.g., roadside stops, facilities, or residences).

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## Carpinteria Executive Summary

### Civil Analysis

#### “TCP West”



**Description**  
**TCP West**  
Intersection of CA-192 (Foothill Rd) and CA-150 (Casitas Pass Rd) (11SKU69761001)

**TCP East**  
Intersection of CA-192 (Casitas Pass Rd) and Rincon Rd. (11SKU73560826)

**Important Landmarks**  
US-101 access about 2 miles south of TCP West

**Population**  
Local Population density is **LOW**. The intersection is in a semi-rural, hilly area with a mix of residential ranch properties, agricultural groves, and low-density housing. Traffic congestion is minimal to light.

**Local Law Enforcement**  
DHS will notify California Highway Patrol and the Santa Barbara County Sheriff's Office at time of operation

**Mission:**  
O/O 870 MP CO provides force protection support to Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) and supporting federal agencies at HSI-operated TCP West and TCP East IVO Carpinteria, CA.

**Purpose:** The purpose of this operation is to provide protection to HSI personnel as they execute a federal **criminal** search warrant operation with approx. 150-200 agents.

**Key Tasks:**

- Secure Key Terrain:** Protect DHS security points and blocking positions located at TCP West and TCP East.
- Provide Area Security:** Safeguard federal personnel conducted operations IVO TCP West and TCP East
- Enable Civil Freedom of Movement:** Do not restrict pedestrian movement. **(Clarification Needed)**
- Support Law Enforcement:** Do not conduct law enforcement activities; detain individuals only in response to an imminent threat and transfer to law enforcement as soon as practicable.
- Comply with Rules for the Use of Force:** Operate IAW SRUF; use force only when authorized and necessary.

**End state:**  
**(Friendly)** 870<sup>th</sup> MP CO elements have returned to Point Mugu and are prepared for redeployment to JFTB  
**(Threat)** Potential civil unrest is deterred or contained in the supported area.  
**(Terrain)** Federal personnel and property in the vicinity of TCPs West and East remain secure with successful retrograde following operations IVO Carpinteria  
**(Civil Considerations):** Civilian movement remains unrestricted, and interactions with the local population are professional, disciplined, and in accordance with mission guidance and SRUF.

**DTG THAT DoD PERSONNEL RECEIVED:**  
**Initial SRUF TRAINING: All personnel complete 22JUN25**  
**Supplemental SRUF Training: Not Conducted**

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
## Carpinteria Executive Summary

### Concept of the Operation

#### “TCP West”



#### “TCP East”



#### Tentative Operational Framework:

**Main Effort (ME):** Protection of TCP West and TCP East

**Unit:** 870 MP CO

**Task:** Establish and provide Force Protection to DHS agents manning TCPs West and East, located along CA-192 in Carpinteria

**Purpose:** To ensure the safety of federal agents manning two TCPs that seal access to CA-192 while a search warrant operation is conducted

**Supporting Effort 1 (SE 1):** Recover Military Tactical Vehicles

**Unit:** 870 MP CO

**Task:** O/O, deploy a tactical wheeled vehicle recovery team from Point Mugu (Naval Base Ventura County) and accompanying security team to 870 MP CO positions IVO TCP West and TCP East.

**Purpose:** To support rapid exfiltration of disabled 870 MP CO vehicles following completion of DHS operations.

#### Proposed Scheme of Maneuver:

##### Phase I: Movement and Staging at Point Mugu (NBVC):

All assigned 870 MP CO vehicles and personnel stage at NBVC NLT 231500JUN25 (HSI plans mission commence in AM on 24JUN25) IOT receive HSI SRT mission brief at 231700JUN25 and conduct final rehearsals following briefings.

**Begins:** 231000JUN25 (Movement to NBVC)

**Ends:** TBD (Movement from Staging to Objective)

##### Phase II: Movement to Objectives:

Two MP Squads depart NBVC at T+0 and commence movement via US-101N to TCP West and East utilizing (1) sequential insertion of TCP West followed by TCP East via CA-192 or (2) simultaneous insertion with release point IVO US-101 and Rincon Rd. Recovery team stages at NBVC

**Begins:** Departure from NBVC at T+0 (alongside DHS convoy)

**Ends:** Arrival at TCP East/West (Approx. T+45min)

##### Phase III: Protect DHS Personnel at TCP West and TCP East:

**Begins:** T+45 (arrival at TCPs); HSI anticipates approx. 3hrs on OBJ.


**Ends:** Following DHS disestablishment of TCP West and TCP East roadblocks.

##### Phase IV: Exfiltration:


**Begins:** Disestablishment of TCP East and TCP West

**Ends:** Arrival at NBVC (45 min following disestablishment)










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
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## Carpinteria Executive Summary

### Concept of Medical



**Primary Hospital – Santa Barbara Cottage Hosp. (Level I Trauma)**  
**Time Distance Analysis:**  
14.7 miles (approx. 30 minutes) via US-101  
**\*No other viable trauma centers within reasonable distance\***

**DoD:** 1x 68W with associated equipment co-located with each TCP  
**Law Enforcement:** DHS anticipates surgeon on-site and will directly coordinate MEDEVAC with local EMS via radio.

**Helicopter Landing Zones**  
**HLZ WEST (prim.):** El Carro Park Field (11S NT 9792 1079), east of TCP West along CA-192.  
**HLZ EAST (alt):** Stables/Farm Fields IVO CA-192 and Shepard Mesa Rd

**MEDEVAC/CASEVAC Plan**  
**Primary:** civilian ALS ambulance transport to SBCH coordinated via 911/DHS-led state/federal interagency coordination. DoD personnel consider ground ambulance link-up IVO HLZs in anticipation of need for air ambul.  
**Alternate:** air ambulance coordinated via same means. DoD personnel consider CASEVAC of personnel via tactical or DHS vehicles to HLZ West (with HLZ East as alternate) to expedite loading process.  
**Contingency:** tactical vehicle or DHS vehicle CASEVAC directly to SBCH.

### Concept of Sustainment

**Logistics:**  
1x DOS per vehicle  
2x fuel cans per vehicle  
1x fire extinguisher per vehicle  
Vehicle BII carried in-vehicle (to include VS-17 panels and bolt cutter for HLZ entry if needed)

**Equipment:**  
MP personnel carry military police batons and no other less-lethal equipment. Riot-length batons staged in vehicles alongside flex-cuffs. All personnel carry CBRN protective masks. Supplemental PVS-14s in vehicles

**CLV Lethal loadout:**  
**Weapon Mix:** all 31B personnel armed with M17 with 1x overwatch M4 in each squad. 91B/25U armed with M4 **No less-lethal ammunition**  
**M4:** 2 x 30 round magazine 5.56 mm. **NO** linked, crew served ammunition on-hand  
**M17:** 50 x rounds 9mm in 3x magazines

### Concept of Communication

**Law Enforcement Operation Commander:** HSI Special Response Team  
**HSI SRT Commander (SCO):** PII

**Location of Key Leaders:** 870 MP CO CDR with TCP West Squad but UNK locations of DHS leadership  
**Command Relationship:**  
870 MP CO provides direct support to DHS at TCP West and TCP East but DHS does not exercise operational control over DoD units. **(Assumed)**  
**Succession of Command:** TCP East Sqd Ldr in event of CDR incap.  
**On-site C2 structure:** DHS HSI will operate on-scene CP on SW OBJ. DoD owes DHS SOI for monitoring inside CP.

<b>Federal Interagency:</b>	<b>DOD:</b>
P: AN/PRC-152 or Harris	P: VHF-Lo (DoD FM)
XL200 on LE interop. freq.	A: VHF (“UTAC” interoperable)
A: DHS-provided radios	C: Cell
C: Cell	E: Runner
E: Runner	

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## Carpinteria Executive Summary

### “HLZ East”

**Note: fencing and terrain may render these HLZs sub-optimal**




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## Carpinteria Executive Summary

**Risk to Mission: MEDIUM**

Hazards:

- Potential for operational compromise via social media or livestreaming in residential areas.
- Limited ingress/egress routes may impact timing, especially if vehicles are blocked or observed.
- Civilian interference from activist groups is unlikely but not impossible if operation is visible or prolonged.
- Tight residential layouts reduce flexibility for tactical repositioning or containment.
- Limited ISR or targeting intelligence reduces situational awareness and precision in positioning mounted/dismounted security.
- HSI and/or Interagency (IA) command friction could create confusion over task ownership or trigger delays in execution.
- Media presence and public optics may constrain tactical flexibility or introduce external pressure on SRUF decisions.

Mitigations:

- Conduct integrated CONOP development and joint tactical rehearsals with DHS/BORTAC and other lead agencies.
- Synchronize SRUF understanding across all echelons; push public affairs guidance to team leaders.
- Confirm radio interoperability and limitations at NBVC staging areas.

**Risk Assessment**

**Risk to Force: MEDIUM**

Hazards:

- Potential for civilian observation or livestreaming during operation, increasing exposure of personnel and tactics.
- Limited mobility due to narrow rural streets, potentially delaying quick extraction or medical evacuation.
- Environmental conditions (e.g., low light, fencing, or animal presence) interfering with approach or movement.
- Minimal nearby state/local enforcement presence in case of emergent resistance.
- Lack of threat information given high-sensitivity warrant execution by DHS personnel hinders assessment of potential threats to DoD personnel and DHS personnel at TCPs East and West posed by the targets of this LE action.

Mitigations:

- Pre-identify staging areas and egress routes; position QRF or medical asset at nearby rally point.
- Conduct advance recon or virtual imagery review; brief team on known terrain hazards.
- Confirm direct radio integration with local agencies. If possible, confirm DHS coordination with local LE/EMS agencies and confirm interoperability with DoD radio assets for medical emergencies. If DHS personnel do not coordinate callsigns/frequencies necessary to reach state/local EMS/LE, DoD action may be necessary to ensure that coordination is possible in the absence of cellular coverage.

**Risk of Inaction: LOW (Assumed)**



Assessment:



- No indication that failure to act would result in loss of life or significant property damage to federal personnel at both TCPs given the volume of HIS personnel on scene

*Conclusion: DoD personnel are not currently equipped with sufficient information to gauge the risk of inaction, given the lack of specific information regarding the posture of the local community in relation to DHS. With appropriate mitigation, risks to DoD personnel are nevertheless low/medium, assuming that DHS personnel are capable of preventing egress of armed subjects from their warrant service objectives.*

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**Request for Information  
(RFI)**

1. Are there any specific arming constraints other than what we've already been briefed? Are military police batons (riot and collapsible) implicitly authorized? DHS is primarily concerned about agitators/protestors.
- 2. What is the extent of the “protection” that the TF intends/agreed to provide to DHS? Does the TF intend for unit to conduct denial of pedestrian/vehicle access past TCPs (at DHS request) as part of the protection mission?**
3. Are we authorized to move to Point Mugu/NBVC the day prior to actions on objective? Has coordination been conducted with Point Mugu/NBVC?
4. Are we authorized to bring a single vehicle wrecker team for emergency recovery and a 1-3x vehicle security team for that wrecker?
- 5. Is unit authorized to conduct a 3x person leader reconnaissance of CA-192 (unarmed, plainclothes, in non-tactical and non-federally-plated vehicles) to confirm route and validate VHF coverage and interoperable repeater status?**

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## GUIDANCE / QUESTIONS / COMMENTS

